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Synthesis  
 
 
Main research problem 
 
This research is a normative enquiry into the citizenship of the EU from a specific 
perspective. The citizenship in question is the one formed at the supranational level of the EU as 
sui generis polity, while the perspective I am taking considers minorities and a way to 
accommodate their needs in a just way. Europe is integrating, both horizontally and vertically, 
and adjusts, among others, its legal and political norms and practices.1  Today, the question of its 
future citizenship is more important than when it was first legally formulated in the Maastricht 
treaty. Furthermore, the external power of globalization and economic interdependence, 
migration and immigration, internal revivals of ethnic and national identities, social movements 
of various identity groups, put the question of citizenship on the top of the EU agenda. The 
problems that arise from immigration, national minorities, sublatern and disadvantaged groups 
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 In Ruling the void, Mair explains why “the point is not how to come to terms with something that is exceptional 
and sui generis – the issue of Europe as an n of 1 – but rather how to understand why the EU has been made that 
way.” v. Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (Verso, 2013). Thus, instead of putting 
the EU into the already existing terminological and conceptual apparatus of political science we should rather take 
an etiological and explanatory approach to this new political entity. 
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are ‘the greatest challenge facing democracies today.’2There are certainly many ways to look at 
this issue, the one taken here is based on normative arguments of philosophical philosophy.  
The European Union citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, which was 
signed in 1992, and came into force in 1993.  European citizenship is complementary 
(additional) to national citizenship as Treaty on the European Union Article 9 stipulates: “Every 
national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship”.  In the Preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which came into force with the Treaty of Lisbon, it 
is stated that the EU “places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the 
citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice”. These legal 
provisions say little about possibilities in which we might use the broaden the notion of the EU 
citizenship. 
The notion of citizenship will be used in this research as a set of legal and political rules, 
practices and discourses encompassing the issues of membership within a political community as 
well as rights, obligation and allegiance towards that community. It will enable me to address the 
normative dimensions of the EU citizenship and theorize its prospects. The main normative 
perspective will be the one which tackles the issue of minorities, misrecognition and injustice 
that member of minorities face in the context of national states. In other words, the task of the 
research is to test whether constitutional patriotism, as an overall model of citizenship, would be 
the best solution for a polity in statu nascendi. Obviously it is a question of should and not is, it 
is a theoretical enquiry of the possible policy reformulations according to certain normative 
criteria, not the description of the status quo.  
The idea of universal citizenship has been strongly challenged by the communitarian and 
multiculturalism scholarship, always in the name of minority groups. That is why it seemed a 
logical starting point to consider the nature and normative questions that lie within a specific 
minority condition. In other words, what sort of citizenship should be embraced, given all the 
circumstances, in order to give a just answer to the needs of minorities? This question becomes 
more complex once minorities are defined. Minorities in this study will be taken in a 
constructivist and relational sense. Instead of limiting the notion of minority only to certain 
groups, this concept should be understood as a reflection of the interplay between individual and 
                                                          
2Kymlicka, Will. The Rights of Minority Cultures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1 
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groups self-perception and the recognition they might invoke in a public, political 
sphere.Minorities are a fluid concept, but still contain the features that allow us to put them in a 
theretical inquiry. Thus, when considering the definitional scope of minorities, I refrain from 
setting one a priori but put forth a minimal set of condition that allow for any group significantly 
affected by the said interplay to be defined as minority.   
Identity has indeed become a buzzword of contemporary political theory. As a boundless 
concept it is often an obstacle for precise theoretical use. Nevertheless, the importance of identity 
is often in the heart of the claims by which the contemporary social movements contest the 
legitimacy of  the nation state. Identity of a citizen in the postmodern era is often fluid and 
elusive, sometimes radicalized and in quest of its authentic true forms, contradictory and 
complementary depending on the subject who evaluates it in the particular historical and social 
context. Minority identity cannot be defined in abstracto. It is necessarily a relational contextual 
concept. The values, world-views and practices of identity minorities are different to majoritarian 
ones. It is a particular good, worldview and lifestyle that minorities are trying to preserve, protect 
and uphold. If we look at a random European constitution, among nominally liberal democratic 
states, we would identify many visions of a good life and principles that some citizens cannot 
adhere to. In some cases, these provisions go even further, disabling the possibility of these 
minorities to identify with the political community or to lead the life they want.  
There are two methodological and theoretical frameworks from which I analyze the issue 
of identity minorities: intersectionality and recognition theory. I believe that the research should 
reflect the difference between identity as a concept in theoretical assessment and identity as a 
personal and group self-identification and its use in political life3. It is important to engage with 
the notion of identity in a way which will reflect its nature in the contemporary world where 
identity became highly politicized.  Intersectionality4 grasps contemporary identity in its 
fluidness and complexity without reifying it. It comprehends the complexity of human existence 
and its plurality of identifications. Finally, recognition theory is beneficial for the intersubjective 
nature of its approach which reflects the relation between majority and minority. 
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 v. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper. "Beyond 'Identity'" Theory and Society 29 (2000): 1-47 
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 v. Anthias, F. and N. Yuval-Davis ‘Contextualizing feminism: Gender, ethnic and class divisions’. Feminist 
Review, 15, 62–75, 1983, and Crenshaw, K. Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, (Chicago, 
IL:University of Chicago Press, 1989) 
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The project affirms the idea that constitutional patriotism is a legitimate and normatively 
desirable form of governance and citizenship, capable of accommodating minorities’ perspective 
and as such it should be embraced by the EU in the course of its incremental 
constitutionalization. Its argumentation is based on a concept of political that acknowledges the 
fact of human diversity under the conditions of liberty and the importance of deliberation and 
compromise in the quest for a polity that allows its citizens, in the full spectrum of their 
diversity, to enjoy the maximum of freedom as long as the freedom of others is duly respected. 
This concept encompasses the Janus face of human beings both as rational and emotional 
individual beings but also as agents embedded within particular groups. Not only do these 
aspects define us as political beings but they also influence the way we negotiate and cooperate 
with others.  
Constitutional patriotism represents post-national and post-conventional political 
identification and allegiance to the set of normative components of a constitution, broadly 
understand as a political and legal order within a certain polity. As such, constitutional patriotism 
leaves the public sphere open for the dynamic development of various identities putting the 
otherness, based on color, race, nation, religion, sex, sexuality, ideology etc., in the context of a 
common citizenship. It is focused on fostering political participation, public discussion and the 
exchange of worldviews under the determined set of legitimate principles.  
Contextually speaking, EU constitutional patriotism is not only the guarantee of the 
protection of minorities’ rights but a step toward genuine equality of EU citizens - legal and 
political, but also ethical. The political project of constitutional patriotism is not, as it was 
criticized, determined by particular identities, histories, constitutional patterns and ethics. 
Constitutional patriotism is rather a different form of understanding politics, political community 
and citizenship. It was ideally developed in a particular setting of plural Western societies and, as 
it will be shown, provides answers to the questions posed by globalization and decline of nation-
states. Its focus are basic political and legal principles rather than particular national or cultural 
discourses, metanarratives and conceptions of the good.   
That constitutional form in the globalized post-national should abandon the framework of 
national state and focus of universal principles of democracy, human dignity, peaceful 
coexistence and diversity. For that constitutional form I use the notion of constitutional 
patriotism, Dolf Sternberger’s syntagm,  that proved to be a good denominator of a form of 
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citizenship and loyalty to political community other than national liberalism, republicanism or 
cosmopolitanism. After elaborating my own theory of constitutional patriotism I will apply that 
theoretical framework to the case of EU and once again, now in practical level, tie the idea of 
justice for minorities with constitutional patriotism. The development of the EU as a plural, 
heterogeneous entity – aimed at peace on the continent, as well as at economic prosperity and 
protection of human and minority rights, is a robust reason for the EU to embrace this model of 
citizenship.   
Constitutional patriotism can be perceived as statist and centralist5. This is especially true 
for the way in which Sternberger elaborated it and the way the critiques of this concept 
understood it. However, the reinterpretation of this concept by Habermas and Muller and the way 
it will be developed in my theory sheds a different light on constitutional patriotism. I will show 
that, despite its aspiration towards universal consolidation of the common political principles, it 
offers a normatively acceptable discourse for minorities. There are two heuristic contributions of 
this dissertation.  Firstly, it will be shown that constitutional patriotism is theory of citizenship 
and not only a form of patriotic loyalty. Secondly, this thesis stresses the normative potential of 
constitutional patriotism for the accommodation of minorities and their need for recognition.  
To conclude, constitutional patriotism in the EU is a new answer to an old puzzle in a 
new setting.  That old puzzle is how to synchronize the different comprehensive ethics, 
especially those of minorities’ which are misrecognized, into a unique post national political 
community. New setting refers to the change of the role of national state and the exterior factors 
of globalization, economic interdependence and, more specifically, the historical emergence of 
the EU citizenship.   
 
 
Research questions and hypothetical framework 
 
This research tries to tackle the relation between identity on one side and basic forms of 
‘social contract’ and citizenship on the other. When minorities and their needs become question 
that needs normative answer? When due to their identity they feel perpetuated forms of injustice? 
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There is a certain type of identity that needs a special attention – the one that puts our 
worldviews and lifestyle in a direct contrast to main constitutional norms and principles. This 
identity makes us think about the originating moment of a society in a form of social contract in 
order to see what kind of issues we are not reluctant to leave to democratic proceduralism. 
Besides, a citizenship as a form of belonging should not include ideas and paradigms that stand 
in contrast or denigrate our lifestyle, provided that these are in accordance with the basic 
postulates of mutual recognition.  
The main theoretical research question is: What kind of political and legal arrangement 
of citizenship would bring the least injustice to the arbitrary nature of personal and group 
identity in multi-identical and deeply diversified societies? It might be divided into several 
research subquestions: 
1. What kind of political recognition is needed and just for identity minorities and what are the 
elements of that recognition? 1.a. Why and under what circumstances can identity become a 
matter of justice? In other words, what are the spheres of injustices for identity minorities? 
2. Which theory of minority rights recognition would be normatively the most acceptable to correct 
this injustice? 2.a. Why answers given by liberal multiculturalism and liberal nationalism seem 
to be inadequate? 
3. How globalization, proliferation of identity politics and recognition claims, intensive migration 
and the erosion of state sovereignty in post-national and post-modern era influence the change in 
the core elements of the citizenship theories? 
4. What could be a theoretical alternative for a type of universal citizenship that accounts for 
minorities’ recognition? 
5. Finally, in the application of this theoretical question at empirical level of a polity in 
statonascendi, can we apply this normative theoretical model to the case of the European Union? 
Why is this case particular in the light of the research puzzle? 
The main research question is how to re-actualize the notion of universal citizenship 
which would still account for the recognition of minorities. Liberal universal citizenship6 has 
been discredited as biased by feminist7, multicultural8 and postmodern theories9.  What form and 
                                                          
6v. e.g.  Rawls, John, A theory of justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.) and 
Barry, Brian,  Culture and equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 
7e.g.Davis, Nira. Woman-nation-state  ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 
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content of universal citizenship would enable minorities to fully participate, give legitimacy and 
identify themselves with a polity?  
Multiculturalism, on one hand, has proposed multicultural citizenship based on the 
respect of cultural differences.  It determines national culture as a fundamental element for a 
functioning democracy (Tamir 1993, Raz 1994, Kymlicka 1995). There are, in my view, many 
normative and empirical flaws within this framework that a competing theory should readdress. 
Liberal culturalism has given superior position to the notion of culture over other types of 
identity with detrimental normative implications for the problem in question (Gianni 2001, 228-
230). We must rethink the idea of injustice based on individual’s identity, defined in broader 
terms, in the context of contemporary national state. Differentiated citizenship, on the other 
hand, proposed by postmodern authors, questioned the very idea of citizenship and its capacity to 
answer to the issues of social cohesion and participation of minorities10.  
The main hypothesis of the thesis is that constitutional patriotism is a normatively 
desirable and feasible form of governance and citizenship, capable of accommodating minorities’ 
perspective and as such it should be embraced by the EU in the course of its emerging 
citizenship. Constitutional patriotism gives an answer to both desirability and feasibility 
criterion. The criterion of normativity is concerned with the question how one community should 
be organized in order to satisfy given ethical criteria while feasibility criterion assesses practical 
possibilities of such enterprise. There are two sub hypotheses. 
The first is that universal citizenship can satisfy the need for recognition of various 
minority groups better than competing theoretical frameworks if it is based on the accepted 
minimum of political and legal principles. We must be recognized as equal citizens despite our 
differences, though difference will dictate a different implementation of the universally binding 
legal and political norms. We should be free to assemble in various groups but still be free to exit 
from that group if our personal worldviews differ.  The only way to apply this in practice is to 
guarantee mutually accepted minimal constitutional rights that allow us to freely enjoy our 
particular concept of good life as long as we respect the liberty of others.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8e.g. Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights  (Oxford: Clarendon Press ;, 1995. 
Print.) 
9e.g. Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the politics of difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.) 
10see Gianni, Matteo, “Taking Multiculturalism Seriously: Political Claims of Differentiated Citizenship.” In 
Citizenship After Liberalism, edited by Karen Slawner and Mark E. Denham. (New York: Peter Lang, 1998.) 
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The second is that both stability and legitimacy of a polity depends on its ability to adopt 
a form of citizenship that corresponds to contemporary social dynamics. Globalization, economic 
interdependence, migration and the decline of sovereignty as a paramount value of national state 
indicate a need for a different allegiance to political community.   This new social momentum 
needs different types of patriotism and solidarity which must be theoretically reformulated. 
Constitutional patriotism is a possible and, in my view, normatively superior option that presents 
an acceptable form of allegiance and identification for minorities in the post-national context of 
the European Union.  
 
 
 
Two main argumentation lines and three levels of analysis 
 
Contextually speaking, EU citizenship inspired by the principles of constitutional 
patriotism is not only the guarantee of the protection of minorities  rights but a step toward 
genuine equality of EU citizens - legal and political, but also ethical. The political project of 
constitutional patriotism is not determined by particular identities, histories, constitutional 
patterns and ethics. Thus, though the theoretical inquiry starts with a problem of rights violation I 
will deal with it as a reflection of recognition issue in a more philosophical sense. Once I define 
what political recognition implies, I will argue that there ought to be a citizenship form which 
responds to this recognition. That political and legal framework should define us as equal 
members of society, with neutral attitude towards our identity, and should not advocate any 
majoritarian discourse or particular concept of good. For me that constitutional form in the 
globalized post-national should abandon the framework of national state and focus of universal 
principles of democracy, human dignity, peaceful coexistence and diversity. After elaborating 
my own theory of constitutional patriotism I will apply that theoretical framework to the case of 
EU and once again, now in practical level, tie the idea of justice for minorities with constitutional 
patriotism. The development of the EU as a plural, heterogeneous entity – aimed at peace on the 
continent, as well as at economic prosperity and protection of human and minority rights, is a 
robust reason for the EU to embrace this model of citizenship.   
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Constitutional patriotism, as the focal point of the research, offers a new theory of 
citizenship and civic allegiance for today's culturally diverse liberal democracies. It rejects 
conventional accounts of republicanism, liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism. It gives a 
different conception of an allegiance to the polity, its axiological value and the principles upon 
which the rights are provided within a political community. That is why it is very applicable to 
the case of the EU, which is not neither a national state as we know them neither it can have 
universal, cosmopolitan aspirations. Being ‘in-between’, the EU has to find an adequate 
theoretical framework which would concede to its multicultural character and supranational, sui 
generis nature. The literature, however, does not show clear cut differences between the substrate 
of constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism, for example. What is the normative content 
of constitutional patriotism, which together with the universality of its political claim makes it 
different to other concepts of civic allegiance? Are there particularities (e.g. ‘militancy and 
memory’,) that Muller defended as normative components of constitutional patriotism? Given 
the theoretical importance of constitutional patriotism as a new theory of citizenship and patriotic 
allegiance, it is puzzling why this concept has not already been conceptually and theoretically 
differentiated from republicanism, liberal nationalism, cosmopolitanism etc. A thesis succeeding 
in such an endeavor would already be a valuable heuristic contribution. That theory should 
include the elaboration of the theoretical assumptions and political principles of constitutional 
patriotism. My conception of constitutional patriotism is an ideal type, a normatively galvanized 
theoretical model.  
There are two crucial ways to refer to injustice that go in favor of proposing 
constitutional patriotism as a superior form of citizenship in contemporary plural societies. The 
first is based on the theory of recognition and the idea that we want to be recognized as equal 
participants in political life of certain community, in the same time having the equal rights and 
being able to identify with that patria on the bases of minimum principles in its constitution that 
we can all share. The second one stems from a contractual theory and democratic theories that 
equate sovereignty and rights and have a rather simple argument: we legitimize the political 
community by investing our own body and rights and in return we can only legitimize the rules 
we can justify11.One might say that the former is focused on good while the latter deal with right. 
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Recognition argument. The first way to perceive injustice is deeply ethical and touches 
upon our worldviews and self-understanding. Considering a common ethical point of view, 
generated by plurality and incommensurability of ethical standings, it is politically more 
acceptable and legitimate, though not necessarily in accordance with principles of democracy, to 
opt for a form of citizenship that will allow for different conceptions of the good. In other words 
it would be unjust to impose a common form of citizenship that excludes, internally or 
externally, certain individuals and misrecognizes them as equal participants of a political process 
on an arbitrary, subjective basis. Arbitrary might be a problematic formulation here. The 
citizenship rules must be such not to misrecognize the citizens’ conception of the good, thus 
allowing for a political community based on consensus and mutual recognition.  
Recognition functions on both individual and collective level. This concept corresponds 
to the definition of minorities advocated in this research: as a relation of an individual or 
collective towards a greater dominant entity. Recognition functions on both private and public 
level it considers us both as members of particular identity groups and citizens of a certain polity.   
In the first part I explain why I do not agree with the basic premises of multiculturalism 
as a political solution for plural societies. Though multiculturalism is a social fact, it should not 
be however transformed into a normative perspective and reflect on political and institutional 
arrangements within a society. Once it is employed as a normative theory it seems to go against 
the principle ideas around which citizenship is construed as a social theory. I put forward an 
argument that if we want to pay due respect to the numerous groups and their respective 
worldviews and lifestyles we must provide a universal level of recognition that guarantees equal 
rights and freedom to them.  
Citizenship by definition involves a form of closure, that necessarily leaves some 
individuals outside.  While cosmopolitan citizenship may dissolve this closure it excludes the 
concept of political rights and obligation, and these are foundational elements of a citizenship as 
such. Constitutional patriotism admits that citizenship is a necessary closure of certain 
individuals with respect to others but at the same time makes sure that this exclusion is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
obeyed by those persons, and to enforce those duties coercively’. Justification assesses goodness of the state, to what 
extent its actions and rules present certain values. I follow Simpson when he says that ‘proper grounds for claims of 
legitimacy concern the transactional components of the specific relationship between individual and institution’ and 
that legitimacy is a logical correlate of individual duty to comply with imposed norms. Here, I use legitimacy both 
as a concept that includes consent and justification, though this distinction will be stressed when needed. v. 
Simmons, A. John,  Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 2001). 
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biased and arbitrary. Basing the focus of patriotic loyalty to commonly accepted universal 
principles legitimized by all members of political community constitutional patriotism reduces 
the possibility for particular and biased objects of allegiance. Arbitrary exclusion is the one that 
excludes even those who have the legitimate right to be included in citizenship. For this, 
however, I will use the concept of constitutional patriotism to clarify the sphere of legitimate 
inclusion/exclusion.   
The argument of political liberalism. The other way to think of justice is not less ethical 
in its consequences, but it primarily considers political injustice - injustice that stems from every 
illegitimate rule. Legitimate is only the rule to which we can give our consent, and every 
majoritarian rule in a plural society over the questions that cannot be left to pure democratic 
procedure is deeply illegitimate. Political liberalism thus comes as a modus vivendi for plural 
societies that citizenship must reflect.  
Namely, every society must be based on a minimum of principles that protect individual 
rights and freedoms and mutual relation between individuals, groups and state. These principles 
are the main criteria of legitimacy of any act or practice. Therefore only in the political order 
which does not infringe upon perception and auto-perception of us as equal citizens and our 
worldviews and lifestyles can we allow the democratic proceduralism to take place.  
This argument is based on a theory of constitutional democracy and the idea of 
autonomy, broadly speaking. It understands constitution, as the basic set of principles, as charter 
of liberty (Dimitrijevic, 2007). Those who are governed must accept the rules by which they are 
governed as legitimate. No set of rules can be imposed on us, unless we can accept them – 
reasonably so in Rawlsian or discursively so in Habermasian terms.  By the autonomy that we 
possess as the creators of the social contract we agree on the regulations that will protect us from 
illiberal rule. Furthermore, we want to be sure that all the rules within a polity we belong to stem 
from a set of principles we have already agreed upon. Constitutional patriotism should in its 
procedural dimension be read in that way: we can accept only those rules that are in accordance 
with constitutional principles that are rooted in our private and public autonomy.12 These two 
dimensions of individual’s liberty to act and create, one confined to his private domain and other 
based on the principles of common intersubjective political life, are  in accordance with common 
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 Habermas, Jurgen, Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy 
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norms of a political community  (constitutional order) in different ways. Just like negative and 
positive freedom, one is based on limitation of intrusion of the others (keeping the liberty of 
private life), while the other one is a matter of publicly achieved endeavors (active participation 
in political life).  
There are three level of analysis of this problem. These levels are differentiated by the 
scope and the level of theoretical inquiry. Although it is important to keep them analytically 
separate, all these levels are intertwined in the course of argumentation. The research problem of 
the thesis requires various layers of argumentation and one could roughly identify three of them: 
a) Philosophical level. This level answers the foundational normative questions of the thesis. The 
relation between right and good, the source of the values, the nature of recognition and its 
importance for autonomy and self-realization. What is the nature of particular good and is there a 
universal need of homo politicus to belong to a political community? 
b) Social theory level. At this level I put citizenship in a global context of globalization, market 
economy and immigration. The change of the national state, its sovereignty and welfarism, also 
influences the concept of citizenship. Many of the concepts in this research are historical and 
relational. These changes must have their reflection in theoretical analysis.  
c) Political analysis. This level of the thesis deals with the politics of multiculturalism and looks 
for the best constitutional arrangement. Once we analyze the philosophical problems and put 
them in a macro historical context, what is the input for creating a concrete policy? This level 
entails an empirical perspective about the given concepts and pays particular attention to the 
development of EU citizenship.  
 
 
 
The structure of the dissertation 
 
The division of chapters should reflect different levels of argumentation concerning this 
multifaceted issue put forth above. In the first part, I deal with the notion of citizenship and 
theories of recognition. I try to identify the main spheres of injustice that minorities face in 
modern national states. The structural injustices caused by the form of citizenship existing in 
liberal national states, within the particular political and legal forms. In other words I focus on 
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political injustice that falls to identity minorities due to the normative implications of national 
citizenship. In this chapter I also address liberal culturalism as the most prominent theoretical 
framework that deals with minorities’ issue. Multicultural citizenship as a dominant set of related 
theoretical approaches and policies that tackles the issue of minorities, has shown certain flaws, 
both theoretically and empirically. The crucial reason for this might be the prevalence of 
particularistic, communitarian perspective in these theories and the minimization of the 
importance of concepts like active citizenship and civic virtue. In this chapter I engage with a 
general normative critique of multicultural approach. Though I agree with liberal egalitarians 
that multicultural world brings new forms of injustice, especially to internal minorities, I do not 
endorse the claim that contemporary liberal states are neutral. While liberal culturalist indirectly 
legitimize the encroachment of the state by majoritarian culture (since culture is so essential for 
our autonomy and wellbeing) and look for similar sublevel spaces for minorities, liberal 
egalitarians seem to neglect that encroachment by claiming that Western liberal democracies are 
neutral. I claim that there are many oppressive discourses entangled in the very concept of nation 
formation that produce injustice and misrecognition.  
In the second part, chapters IV and V, I proceed with the elaboration of constitutional 
patriotism as a distinct form of post-national citizenship, tracing its historical roots and critically 
assessing the relevant literature. In fifth chapter I analyze this concept with reference to the other 
similar concepts and ideas within political theory. I elaborate theoretical assumptions 
(anthropological, ethical and historical) and practical principles of a general theory of 
constitutional patriotism. In the final part of this chapter I explain why this form of citizenship 
would be acceptable from the standpoint of minorities and their identities. Zooming in from the 
preceding general comparative analysis, therein I also give a comparison of constitutional 
patriotism to other theoretical frameworks of citizenship.  
In the last part, chapters VI and VII, I will try to apply the theoretical framework to the 
case of the EU as a special type of post-national postmodern citizenship in statu nascendi. I 
embark on a reason-giving exercise and try to to provide reasons in favor of constitutional 
patriotism in a specific historical and political context of the EU. In this part, I try to apply the 
previously developed normative and theoretical findings in the concrete empirical setting of an 
emerging citizenship form. This part should indicate the flaws of the ideal theory and open 
additional normative questions that a citizenship theory should address before it can be of 
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practical consequence. Here I will apply the concept of constitutional patriotism developed in the 
second part to the emerging EU citizenship. Combining and cross-examining theoretical 
thresholds and empirical evidence from the EU will bring me to three main arguments in favor of 
constitutional patriotism as an optimal concept of citizenship for the EU, particularly from the 
perspective of minorities.  
 
